Future Analysis of Nation State

Future Analysis of The Nation-State System Introduction: It is common to hear of the threats to the nation-state system in the contemporary world. Such threats seem to originate from many different quarters, at different level of the global system. This impending sense that the nation-state is somehow in â€Å"crisis† led to analyze the question of â€Å"the contemporary crisis of the nation-state? † But before we go into the analysis, it is important to look into the ideas that would help to understand the case, under discussion, in a better way.To begin with, let’s see the definition of nation, state and the nation-state system, according to the context under discussion. Nation According to the Oxford English dictionary, the word nation literally means, community of people having mainly common descent, history, language, etc or forming sovereign state or inhabiting territory. From the above definition, there are two kinds of nations, the ethnic nation (communit y with common descent) and demotic nation (community with common territorial boundaries). E. K.Francis draws a distinction between ‘ethnic’ nations that are based on belief in common descent and a sense of solidarity and common identity, and ‘demotic’ nations that are based on shared administrative and military institutions, common territorial boundaries for protection and the mobility of goods and people. This is similar to the distinction often made between ‘cultural nations’, based on criteria such as language, customs, religion and the ‘political nations’, that are more contractual and derive from shared institutions, shared citizenship and a sense of shared history.State According to Oxford English dictionary, state literally means, political community under one government. This means a community which is coherent with the government of the state obeys the government with its own will, making government responsible for it. It is the political organization of the people under one government. Nation-State System The nation-state system is traditionally, an amalgamation of ‘nation’ (one people) with ‘state’ (one government). If one were to imagine an abstract image of the globe one would see gridlines.These lines mark off different nation-states. Each one is separate from the others and sovereign inside its defined and unmoving borders. These nation-states interact with each other, be it through war or trade in a relationship that is theoretically simple. Each nation-state is ‘equal’ in terms of having sovereignty (self-determination) and the sole right to use legitimate force inside its own borders. This modern nation-state system came into existence with the treaty of Westphalia, 1648.In international system, ‘low’ politics of trade and business and temporary agreement of MNCs, IGO and INGOs are less important than that of ‘high’ politics th e nation-state, with its role of protecting its sovereignty from the attack and of maintaining stability inside its borders. Today, there are more than 200 nation-states in the world. Nation-State as a Historical-Political Form The ideal articulation of ‘nation’ as a form of cultural community and the‘State’ as a territorial, political unit is now widely accepted and often taken as unproblematic.Yet scholars of nationalism point out that that was not alwaysthe case. That every nation deserves its autonomy and identity through its ownsovereign state (even though many may not demand it) is an ideal that manytrace to the French Revolution. As Cobban points out, whereas before the FrenchRevolution there had been no necessary connection between the state as a political unit and the nation as a cultural one, it became possible and desirablesince then to think of a combination of these two in a single conception of the nation-state.That this still remains an †˜ideal’ and one vastly unrealized, as inthe existence of several â€Å"multi-national’’ states, is also largely recognized, although much of international relations theory fails to follow through on the implications of that ‘reality’. Concept of Sovereignty The meaning and concept of sovereignty has assumed many different shapes. Moreover, it has frequently changed its content,its laws and even its functions during the modern period. Hugo Grotius, in his famous work De Jure Belli ac Pacis: Sovereignty is ‘that power whose acts †¦ may not be void by the acts of other human will. Other political theorists have, in general, given similar definitions. Oppenheim: ‘Sovereignty is supreme authority, an authority which is independent of any other earthly authority. ’ Willoughby:‘Sovereignty is the supreme will of the state. ’ Various writers on political theory have insisted that every legally recognized state by defin ition is sovereign. It is simply a reminder that just as every state is legally equal to any other, so it is legally sovereign. But if we see the contemporary interaction of states with reference to above definition, we would definitely conclude that the concept of sovereignty has again changed.The concept of absolute sovereignty has become obsolete and has been replaced by the concept of relative sovereignty/authority and interdependence. Just as in real world, some states are bigger in size, power and influence than others just like that sovereignty of the states has become relative. It must be recognized that there are now degrees of sovereignty and self-determination. Only sovereignty left with states is legal sovereignty. Except it every other aspect of the state is relative or dependent on intrastate and interstate factors. Concept of NationalismNationalism is the patriotic feeling for one’s nation or country. Professor Louis L. Snyder defines nationalism as ‘a pr oduct of political, economic, social and intellectual factors at a certain stage in history, is a condition of mind, feeling or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-define geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common traditions and common customs, venerating its own heroes, and in some cases having a common religion. Some point out that the political nations are based more on ‘civic’ nationalism, as opposed to the ‘ethnic’ nationalism characteristic of the cultural nations. These observations are based on two popular theories of nationalism. Primordialists’ approach the extent to which culture exists as a given resource for the constitution of nationsand instrumentalist’ approach, the extent to which culture has to be invented by nationalist elites.The primordialist approach, evident in the early work of Geertz, Shils and in the socio-biological theory of Van den Berghe, argues that ethnic and cultural attachments are pre-givens, or at least assumed givens, and appear ‘natural’ to members of a group. As against this, the instrumentalist approach, evidenced to varying degrees in the works of Brass, Hobsbawm and Nairn, argues that ethnic attachments are often invented and manipulated by elites to construct the nation as a privileged source of a group’s loyalty.I’m of the view that all national identities are constructed as dictated by the instrumentalist theory. In other words, there are no ‘natural’ nationalities. There is no a priori manner in which peoples can be made into nations. It is the work ofnationalism to construct or produce a ‘nation’. In the words of BenedictAnderson, the nation has to be ‘imagined’. Nations are imagined ‘because themembers of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members,meet them, o r even hear of them, yet in the minds of each livesthe image of their communion. It is through nationalist ideology that thiscommunion is constructed. Anderson traces the development of nationalism to the development of print-capitalism, which helped to produce and disseminatea common culture to ground the national imagination. 18 Regardless of what basisis used to ground this communion, nations are ultimately based on what EtienneBalibar has called `’fictive ethnicities’. It is the work of nationalist ideology to ‘ethnicize’’ a community.It is through the representational labor of nationalist ideology that a community is constructed as if it formed a natural communionwith its unique and singular origin and destiny. ‘Nation building’ hasalways been a project of the state as well and the widespread existence of globalnorms on sovereignty and self-determination (and the continuing appeal of theideal of the ‘nation-state’) now ensure that existing states themselves have toengage to some extent in attempts at nation building. In other words, it is notsimply that nations often seek and demand states, but states need nations as well.These efforts of nation building are more evident and stark at times of crisis such as war,but in reality are always in existence in more subtle ways through various statepolicies and programs, as well as through the ideological state apparatusesin civil society. In that sense state building and nation building have become simultaneousand symbiotic processes. Yet for analytical purposes it is perhaps better not toconfuse these two processes because, even if the ends they seek are somewhatsimilar or complementary, the processes remain somewhat different.State buildingoccurs through the penetration and integration of the territorial economy,polity and society and speaks to questions of political authority and effectivegovernance. Nation building is the construction of a cohesive c ultural communitythat can demand citizen loyalty and commitment. As it is shownin the nextsection, the fragmentation of nation-states refers tonation building, and inparticular to the inability of the state to build cohesive nations, while those that point to the effects of globalization on weakening the nation-state often (but notexclusively) refer to problems with state building.Challenges to The Nation-State Forces of Fragmentation The authority of the nation-state depends to a large extent on its consistency,unity and stability in the eyes of its public or, in other words, of the ability ofthe state to project a united nation. The imagined nations, as Anderson pointsout, present themselves as ‘communities’,‘because regardless of the actualinequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is alwaysconceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’’.Part of the project of the state is to seekconsent from its citizens as to the depth and eq uality of that comradeship. Yetthe national space has many differences and conflicts – among ethnicities, races, religious groups, classes, genders, etc. Each of those differences threatens the coherence and unity of the national fabric. Most of the literature on fragmentation focuses on ethnic (and religious) conflicts within existing states. Nationbuilding requires that such ethnic and religious conflicts are effectively controlledby the state.Even though ‘assimilation’ has been an acknowledged goal of many states historically, Talal Asad has pointed out that hegemonic power worksnot so much through suppressing differences by homogenization, as throughdifferentiating and marginalizing. The ‘nation’ in projects of the state does notrepresent a singular cultural space so much as a hierarchy of cultural spaces. What RudolfoStavenhagen calls an ‘ethnocratic state’- a nation-state controlledessentially by a majority or dominant ethnie, able to exercise cultural hegemonyover the rest of the ation – is the rule rather than the exception in the modernsystem of nation-states. The success of nation-building depends on the extentto which the state is able to secure a broad measure of ‘consent’ on thishierarchy. The national project requires the construction of what Asad calls a‘cultural core’ that becomes the ‘essence’ of ‘the nation’. At the most basiclevel, fragmentation occurs when the state is no longer (if ever) able to effectivelysecure consent on this cultural core.States have a variety of available means to meet the demands of ethnic and religious groups within their borders. To the extent that assimilation is no longerconsidered possible or effective, or even desirable, states can and do makeattempts to accommodate such demands through various political and institutionalmechanisms. Regardless of how determined and well organized thosedemands are, which migh t make a polity quite unstable in certain situations,fragmentation refers more specifically to situations where such demands arelinked with claims to territory.Or using Oomen’s definition, it is when an ethnic group establishes a moral claim to territory within a state thatone can speak of sub nationalisms, or what are sometimes called ethno nationalisms. Many states that are classified as nation-states within international relationshave always been such multi-national states – like in India where different ethnicand linguistic groups are regionally organized on the basis of claims to territory,or as in the case of the Scots and Welsh within Britain. Such moral claims toterritory might not necessarily generate separatist movements.But it is the existence of such sub nationalisms thatcreates the possibility of the fragmentation of the nation-state. Ultimately, thiscan be a crisis of the nation-state because such nationalisms threaten to fragmentone of the central bases of state sovereignty -the territorial integrity of the existingnation-state. Or maybe the civic (more than the cultural) nationalism of manymodern states makes the nation-state (unlike ethnicity or religion), simply toolarge, amorphous and psychically distant to be the object of intimate affection.The point here is that fragmentation occurs and is occurring rapidly in theworld, as evidenced in Bosnia, Rwanda, Spain, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, Canada, toname a very few geographically diverse examples. Fragmentation occurs whenthere is a disarticulation between the state as a spatial unit (with fixed territory)with the spatial claims of the nation(s) in whose name(s) it speaks. The ultimate concern with fragmentation, as I mentioned above, is that itthreatens the territorial integrity of existing nation-states.But as IstvanHont points out, even though there might be legitimate grounds for concern over theterritorial integrity of contemporary states devolving into smaller territorialunits, t his should be seen as a ‘triumph’ rather than a ‘crisis’of the nation-state. Fragmentation is a threat to the existence of particular states, rather thanthe system of nation-states. It represents the failure of particular states to holdon to the ‘spatiality’ (both geopolitically and culturally) of their claims toauthority.But in more general terms, fragmentation represents the success ofthe ideal of the nation-state – that every nation deserves its own state. This seemsmore obvious in the case of the end of empire and its dissolution into independentpolities each claiming the title of nation-state, first in the post-World War II eraof decolonization, and more recently in the break-up of the Soviet Union andthe Eastern bloc countries. Forces of Globalization The effects of globalization on the nation-state are a bit more complex.Forces outside the nation-state can hold back, enable and influence the nation-state in a variety of ways. For the purposes of this discussion, I classify theseforces into two groups – forces of economic globalization and forces of culturalglobalization, although the two are quite closely related in many ways. Economic Globalization The development of thefield of international political economy (IPE) has pointedout thatexclusive focus on the nation-state as a unit of analysis can be inadequate inunderstanding the dimensions of economic activity in the modern world.Some approaches within IPE, such as Interdependence, Regime and HegemonicStability Theories continue to be state-centric. But that is not the case with anumber of other approaches. Marxist approaches in particular have been dividedover the question of the role of the state. This division has been over thequestion of the extent to which the supranational character of the capitalistmode of production restricts all modern state structures versus the extent to which the state plays a direct role in promoting the internationaliza tion ofcapital.Exemplifying the former perspective, Wallerstein’s World Systems Theory was based on the ontological dominance of the world capitalist system,based on a single division of labor between the core, peripheral and semi peripheralregions of the world. Even though Wallerstein recognized the significance of nation-states in the modern world, in his analysis the essentials ofmarket exchange at the international level reduced state autonomy so much sothat nation-states were but super structuralattachments helping in the reproductionof the modern global capitalist system.But other scholars who have lookedat the internationalization of capital have stressed how the state continues toplay a role in the reproduction of capitalism. Robin Murray has pointed out thatas capital extends beyond its national borders, the historical link that bound itto its particular domestic state no longer necessarily holds. But the domestic stateis not territorially limited in its activities, and it might well ‘follow’ its capital and perform the critical ‘economic roles’ that it has always played in thereproduction of capitalism.The gradual shift from multinational corporations towards more transnational corporations or from the internationalization of economic activity (aseconomic activity spreads across state borders) towards the globalization ofeconomic activity (which involves a more purposefulcombination of economicactivity spread globally) also limits state capacity to control and influencedomestic national economies and thus weakens state authority over its nationalspace.This is what Mittelman has called ‘the spatial reorganization of production, the interpenetration of industries across borders [and] the spread of financial markets’. The spatial reorganization of production has been accompanied by changes in the international division of labor, which has includedamong other changes the feminization of certain kinds of labor . The globalization of international finance has led to the enormous ‘flow of capital andcurrencies with increasing rapidity, huge rowth of global currency speculation,offshoots trading and currency instability, and has increasingly reduced the ability of the state to control monetary and fiscal policy. In general, it hasbeen argued that in the face of economic globalization, state autonomy isconsiderably reduced, as the state becomes simply a facilitator of globalization. In particular, it is the weakening of the welfare state occurring in the wake of the globalization of economic liberalization that is seen to limit state competenceand authority all over the world.If the origins of the state had been in theprovision of security, the growth of the ‘welfare state’ in post-World War IIindustrial societies has now been well known. But the decreasing appealof Keynesian macroeconomic management in post-industrial societies (and theshift to supply-side economics) and t he accompanied reduction in public provision of social services threatens the legitimacy of the state as it increasingly fundsitself with little control over the economy (as jobs, investment migrate) andunable to meet the expectations of the people for securing their prosperity.Inpost-colonial societies, the disintegration of the ‘developmentalist state’ with the increasing adoption of IMF- and World Bank-sponsored market liberalization,is also a potential threat to state legitimacy as the state is unable to deliver onpromises of basic needs provisions, as the vehicle for social justice and equalityand as the symbol of national resistance to external pressures.In many ways, this sense of the declining ‘political effectiveness’ of the contemporary state is not entirely baseless. Even if the state cannot, and perhaps nevercould, totally or effectively control economic activity within its borders, itsability to regulate such activity to an extent and its willi ngness to undertakeredistributive measures that raged some of the more socially evileffects of the market brought it a certain amount of legitimacy and approvalfrom large sections of the population.This expression of the nation-state, not simply as a provider of order and security, but as a provider of social (andeconomic) needs (as in education, health care, nutrition, housing as well as inensuring a certain level of employment, minimum wages, price stability, etc. )has been an important and significant development of the second half of the20th century. Even if there is increasing consensus in policy-making circlesaround the world of the efficiency of market forces and the need for marketliberalization and cut-backs in state activity in the economic kingdom, the expectationsof the population from the state tend to be more complex.Even wheremany sections of the population might be dissatisfied with the functioning ofexisting states, the initial impact of market reforms on large sect ions of thepopulation can be quite adverse and severe. This is evidenced, for instance, inthe cut-back of social welfare programs in advanced industrial societies on minority groups and women, as also in the adoption of IMF-imposed structuraladjustments programs on poor people and especially women in the lowereconomic classes in the developing world.The internationalization and globalization of economic activity, combined with the global spread of economic liberalization can in that sense certainly weaken the ability of the state to meet theexpectations of sections of the population, and possibly create news kinds of‘legitimacy crises’. This is not simply a practical problem for particular states, which of course it is. John Dunn points out that while the immediate appeal of the nation derives much more from the subjective force of being born in a particular setof social relations, the appeal of the state lies in its efficiency or competence, whichis much more objective .To the extent that the idea of the modern nation-stateis so closely linked to the idea of the welfare state or the developmentalist state, the effectiveness of the contemporary state depends on the ability of thestate to deliver on ‘welfare’ or ‘development’. To that extent, the decreasedcompetency of the state to deliver on those promises could create the kindsof legitimacy crises that might call into question the durability of the nation-state. Perhaps, over time, expectations of what the state can or should do willchange. Decline of a particular form of the modern state does not indicate theend of the nation-state form.As David Armstrong argues, since states are ‘social actors’ and indeed become states through ‘international socialization’,new conceptualizations of the state’s role in the national economy that emergeas a consequence of globalization may become ‘statefied’ as states reach‘ intersubjecti ve understandings of how to restructure themselves and how tostrengthen the institutions of international society to accommodate globalization’. Nation-state legitimacy will depend on the extent on which ‘consent’coheres around new constructions of ‘national/state identity’ more in tunewith the new roles of the state.To some extent, states that have recognized the impossibility of enjoyingpolitical autonomy over economic issues have increasingly turned to non-stateentities for performing these functions more effectively. For instance, Alan Milward has argued that post-war European integration, in particular the launchof monetary union, was an attempt by many European nation-states to increasethe capacity of the state to meet the expectations of its citizens, and in doing soto ‘rescue the nation-state’ from its demise.Transfer of political authority overmonetary decision making to a supranational entity, hence losing fiscal andmonetary so vereignty, was perhaps the only way for states to ensure a certainamount of economic stability in many of the states racked by huge currencyfluctuations. In this somewhat personal analysis, the creation of supranationalentities like the European Union could in contradiction make the nation-statestronger rather than weaker. But even if the role of the state can be reduced to being the ‘agent’ ofglobalization, the state remains important for a number of other reasons.Despitethe rise of various forms of terrorism, including ‘state terrorism’, the stateretains significantmonopoly on the use of legitimate violence. The state continuesto have monopoly on taxation, is still seen as the ultimate negotiator of socialconflict, is expected to provide ‘security’ from external threats, and to performa variety of other functions. Perhaps most importantly, in the face of globalization, the state continues to be seen as the site for many to seek protection fro msome of the effects of global corporate capitalism.As Panitch points out, ‘[n]otonly is the world still very much composed of states, but insofar as there is anyeffective democracy at all in relation to the power of capitalists and bureaucratsit is still embedded in political structures that are national or sub national inscope’. The exercise of democratic control over capital takes on an even greaterimportance for Southern countries increasingly subject to IMF pressures, where the state is sometimes the only refuge against eo-imperialism. The point is that even though state legitimacy is potentially threatened by economic globalization, much depends on how state roles are reconfigured inthe face of globalization. Even if the economic limits to national politics is not anew problem for state legitimacy, the qualitative shift in economic globalization in late 20th-century capitalism, as well as the development of the nature of thecontemporary state, does change somewhat the implications for state legitimacy.In itself, the distribution of some of the functions of state to other non-state entities,whether supranational or sub national (micro-management rather than macro-managementby the state), does not threaten state legitimacy, but can in factstrengthen it. Economic globalization certainly requires different state roles, changingexpectations from the people, and new measures of state competency, butdoes not necessarily threaten the existence of the nation-state. Cultural Globalization There is also a cultural dimension to globalization that has implications for thenation-state and its future.This has more to do with issues of identity. RolandRobertson defines globalization as both ‘the compression of the world and theintensification of consciousness of the world as a whole’. While the process ofthis compression might have been occurring over a very long time, the recentgrowth of communications technology (cheap and fast air travel, te lephonic andtelegraphic services, satellite media transmissions, the Internet and cyberspace)has both accelerated and deepened this process. This is a process that both brings the world together and splits the world apart simultaneously.As Stuart Hall points out, globalization at the cultural level has led to both the universalisation and the fragmentation and multiplication of identities. Robertson explainsglobalization leads to the simultaneity of ‘the particularizationof universalism (the rendering of the world as a single place) and theuniversalization of particularism (the globalized expectation that societies . . . should have distinct identities)’. In his more recent work, Robertson has offered the concept of â€Å"glocalization’’ to emphasize the simultaneity of the homogenizing and eterogenizing forces of globalization in the late 20th-century world. Keeping in mind that these two processes are simultaneous, following are theirdifferent implicati ons for nation-states. The homogenization forces of globalization, in one sense is, the universalisation of the demand of the nation-state as an ideal cultural – political form of collective identity is itself a product of globalization. The now globalised belief that nations exist and deserve their states is fairlywell accepted and forms the normative foundation for most contemporaryinternational organizations.In addition, these international organizations have served to institutionalize the form of the nation-state, and enforce a certain amount of standardization in the nation-state system. John Meyer has shown globalization in this sense serves to strengthen the nation-state. Meyer pointsout that despite the vast economic inequalities among states, there is a worldculture that creates significant isomorphism among nation-states and helpskeep this dispersed world polity together.The global system of nation-statesis based on global norms that define external and internal sov ereignty, and is exemplified and reproduced through the similarity of the goals of‘equality’ and ‘progress’pursued by all nation-states. In other words, worldlevelcultural and organizationalinstructions for development and progress haveresulted in nation-state uniformity as all states follow similar objectives, policiesand programs.Connie McNeely elaborateson this concept of world culture by showing international organizations like the UN set normative and rigid standards of behavior for statepractices (increasingly conformed to by nation-states around the world), andin doing so play a role in institutionalizing the nation-state system. She specifically shows the nation-state system has been standardized and reproducedthrough the invention and spread of national income statistics, resulting fromthe efforts of UN statisticians and from the UN collection and distribution of comparative tables.At least in this sense, the homogenization force ofglobalization re produces and continues the nation-state system, rather thanthreatens its existence. Another implication of homogenization is on globalized identities in terms of global consumer capitalism. Benjamin Barber describesthe homogenizing drives of ‘McWorld’ (or what has also been called the‘MacDonaldization’ of the world) which has created ‘commercialized’ and‘depoliticized’ world. Kenichi Ohmae describes a consumerist world in whichbrand loyalty replaces national loyalty.But this world that is homogenized by the globalization of consumption can’t erase the troublesomeness of national commitments. Corporate icons can’t provide the kind of collectiveunity that national identities provide, and this is perhaps one reason for the‘global localization’ that Ohmae points to, in which product marketing adaptsto local (often interpreted as national) conditions, or what has come to be knownas ‘micro-marketingâ€⠄¢. But it is these depoliticized identities that also create thedrive to ‘resecure narrow identities’ so as to ‘escape McWorld’s monotonously firm essentials’.The heterogenising forces of globalization, or what Robertsondescribes as the ‘universalization of particularism’claims, in which not only has the ‘expectation of uniqueness’ become institutionalized and globally widespread, but the local and the particular itself isproduced on the basis of global norms. In other words, globalization of cultural norms has produced not just the legitimacy of the idea of the nation-state, butalso the expectation that such nation-states should embody unique and distinctidentities.This once again represents the globalization of the nationalist idea,the idea thatnation-states are legitimate because the nation is a unique, authenticcultural entity, with its singular and distinct identity. Beyer, in describingRobertson’s work, calls t his the ’relativization of particularisms’, which leads to a search for particularistic identities. The globalization of this idea createsthe potential for declarations of national identity, and can ultimately create themomentum for fragmentation of existing nation-states that are somehow seen as‘inauthentic’and hence illegitimate.To the extent that such differentiationalso occurs as a response to certainhomogenizing drives of globalization,thisalso represents a success of the nationalist idea. Assertions of collective identityboth as an element of, as well as in response to, globalization is then more‘nation-producing’ than ‘nation-destroying’. This certainly is an effect of globalization that, in keeping with the argument of the last section on fragmentation,is not a threat to the nation-state but a measure of its success.The Altered Nation-State Panitch in Mittelman says, ‘globalization is authored by states and is primar ily aboutreorganizing rather than bypassing them. ’ Rather than suggesting that the nation-state is fated to dissolve in the face of globalization, or that it will remainthe primary unaltered unit of international relations, there is a postulation of an ‘alteredstate’. The nation-state is said to exist now in one form, to have existed in the past inanother, and to be transforming itself actively into a third.This is a proposition that assumes a resilient but elastic nation-state, one that evolves over time, and whichbecomes more or less influential in different spheres depending on the utility of thatinfluence. One example of this ‘altered state’ thesis is that proposed by Philip Cerny, who suggests that ‘the nation-state is not dead’, although its role has changed. He envisages the transformation of the nation-state from being agoverning system concerned with welfare to being a system concerned with competition. Unsurprisingly he calls this the ‘competition state’.The competition state exists in aworld of increased fragmentation and globalization, and is characterized by a decrease ofpublic services and an increase of private services or industry. The competition state is amix of civil and business organization, and is concerned with effective returns oninvestment or effort. In the long run the ‘state is developing into an enterpriseassociation, with key civic, public and constitutional functions [†¦] subordinate to theglobal marketplace. ’ Another example of the ‘altered state’ is envisioned by Leo Panitch.Panitch thinks that ‘globalizing pressures even on advanced industrial states has led to a reorganization of the structural power relations within states [but has] not diminished therole of the state. ’ The nation-state is changing, but is not facing adisempowerment or loss of sovereignty. Indeed, Panitch would understand globalization as being written by nation-states, and the role of the state in collecting taxation,providing security, and having the monopoly of legitimate violence inside its sovereignborders as being unchanged.Globalization and alteration of the state role is an attempt to secure ‘global and domestic rights of capital’, and not aneo-medieval dissolution of the state apparatus. Conclusion There are, no doubt, a number of threats to the coherence and durability of particular existing nation-states, but that doesn’t weaken the nation-state as a historical form, as a contemporary organizing principle for collective cultural and political identity. Certainly, the severe crisis of particular nation-states, such as Afghanistan,Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, can generate a sense of anxiety about thefuture of the nation-state itself.Yet this sense of crisis has not seeped into acrossthe globe and most existing nation-states remain relatively stable and viabledespite the existence of various ethno-national ist movements within them. The graph given above shows the trend of nation-state over a period of 100 years. The graph is the statistical evidence of the appeal and continuance of the nation-state system as a dominant cultural-political system. In the article which was the basis of this analysis, Saquib Karamat indicates economic globalization, cultural globalization and blurring of the national ideologies as threat to the existence of nation-states.Furthermore, he says global issues also question the sovereignty of nation-states. But as analyzed above, economic globalization and cultural globalization in fact strengthen the nation-state than weakening it. While blurring of national ideology is the contemporary issue of weak states, who in some way need to put into work a national project of nation-building to keep their territories intact. The global issues like global warming don’t question the authority of the state rather they implicate that all nations need to work in su ch a framework of communication which enables to reach a solution of common consent.Now, the analysis on the future of nation-state has made some points clear, that a nation need not to be only one with common descent (ethnic nations), there can also be nations who share common boundaries (demotic nation). A state, which has either ethnic nation or demotic nation, needs to be coherent in order to remain legitimate. The historical-political form of nation-state was based on one nation – one state rule. The concept of sovereignty has changed from absolute sovereignty to degrees of sovereignty and interdependence. The process of nation-building or nationalism is a tate’s tool to keep it coherent. All national identities are constructed by national elites and weak states which are facing the threat of territorial disintegration should consciously employ national labor in nation-building. The forces of fragmentation and forces of globalization which seems to put at risk the existence of nation-state system, actually strengthen nation-state as a historical form and are driving forces in the evolution of the nation-state as discusses above in the respective sections. So, nation-state needs to alter itself in order to remain competent system for the years to come.The necessity is evident from the change in the conceptof sovereignty. Since it has changed, nation-state should also be restructured in the face of globalization and fragmentation. 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